Saudi-Turkey rivalry reshapes Eurasian trade corridor: European supply chains and strategic autonomy face a test.

Geoeconomic Restructuring of the Asia-Europe Trade Corridor

A recent alternative trade route promoted by Saudi Arabia and Turkey is challenging the original plan for the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which was jointly proposed in 2023 by India, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, among others. According to *The Times of Israel*, after a meeting in Riyadh, the transport ministers of Saudi Arabia and Turkey signed an agreement to build a railway extending from western Saudi Arabia through Jordan and Syria to Turkey's Mediterranean ports, completely bypassing Israel and the Port of Haifa. This development not only concerns the regional landscape of the Middle East but also has profound implications for Europe's supply chain layout, port competitiveness, and the EU's strategic autonomy.

The Original IMEC Plan and Europe's Logic for Participation

The original IMEC was designed as a sea-land multimodal network connecting India, the Middle East, and Europe, with key nodes including Israel's Port of Haifa, Cyprus's Port of Limassol, Greece's Port of Piraeus, and Italy's Port of Trieste. On the European side, Greece, Italy, France, and Cyprus have expressed strong support for the corridor. The Port of Piraeus, already operated by China COSCO Shipping Corporation, has become a crucial hub for Asia-Europe trade; the Port of Trieste is seen as a potential gateway to Central and Eastern Europe. For the EU, IMEC is not just a commercial route but a strategic asset to strengthen economic ties with the Indo-Pacific region and reduce dependence on a single transportation route, such as the Suez Canal.

The Economic and Strategic Costs of the Saudi-Turkey New Plan

According to current estimates, the new Saudi-Turkey route extends the land section by over 1,000 kilometers. This adjustment directly raises transportation costs and time, altering the project's economic basis. Additionally, the plan may revive the port potential of Syria and Lebanon, but the geopolitical stability of these two countries remains questionable. From a European perspective, if the new route is implemented, it will weaken the hub status of EU member states such as Greece, Cyprus, and Italy within IMEC, while strengthening Turkey's logistics influence. Given the ongoing maritime sovereignty disputes between Turkey and Greece and Cyprus, as well as the increasingly strengthened defense cooperation between France and Cyprus, support for the alternative route within the EU will face serious divisions.

India's Strategic Choices and the EU's Wait-and-See Approach

India has not yet publicly stated whether it accepts the route change. Indian Prime Minister Modi recently held intensive meetings with leaders of Myanmar, Cyprus (holding the EU Council Presidency), and the UAE, and plans to hold a business summit with French President Macron in Nice. These diplomatic moves indicate that India views IMEC as a long-term strategic tool rather than a purely economic project. For the EU, if India ultimately leans toward the Saudi-Turkey plan, Europe will have to adjust its infrastructure investment direction under the "Global Gateway" strategy framework. Although the European Commission has not yet officially commented, internal assessments have begun on the commercial impact of the new route on European port cities (such as Piraeus, Trieste, and Limassol) and potential issues related to state aid and competition policy.

Competitiveness Challenges for European Ports

</SEGMENT>European hubs such as Piraeus and Trieste will be directly impacted by changes to the IMEC route. If Asia-Europe trade bypasses Israel and Greece, these ports may face risks such as reduced cargo throughput and extended payback periods for logistics investments. The EU needs to coordinate member states and port authorities to re-prioritize infrastructure. At the same time, the EU may need to provide targeted subsidies to ports to maintain competitiveness—but this will test the flexibility of EU state aid rules.

EU Strategic Autonomy and Supply Chain Resilience

At a deeper level, the dispute over the IMEC route reflects a practical challenge in building EU supply chain resilience: the Middle East-Indian Ocean trade corridor on which Europe depends could be reshaped by regional geopolitical competition. If the Saudi-Turkish new plan succeeds, it will strengthen Turkey’s role as the "gatekeeper" of the Asia-Europe land corridor, and Turkey is not a formal EU member, posing a potential constraint on the EU’s strategic autonomy. On the one hand, the EU needs to maintain dialogue with Turkey to safeguard energy and trade security; on the other hand, under pressure from Greece and Cyprus, it must avoid over-empowering Ankara.

Conclusion: From a Single Corridor to a Competitive System

The current situation indicates that IMEC may no longer be a single plan, but will become part of a system of multiple competing corridors. The alliance between Saudi Arabia and Turkey, coupled with India’s undecided stance, means that Europe needs to prepare for a trade landscape in the "post-IMEC" era. Port cities and EU policymakers must begin now to assess: when regional connectivity solutions shift from cooperation to competition, how should Europe’s port investments, trade policies, and geo-economic priorities be reordered? This game over routes, hubs, and strategic autonomy has become one of the most influential business and policy issues in Eurasia for the next decade.